In their testimony before Congress today, General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker began painting a picture of American progress in Iraq. But even as the United States faces a diminishing threat from Al Qaeda thanks in part to former Sunni insurgents the U.S. has largely co-opted, American forces find themselves increasingly engaged in an intra-sectarian Shiite conflict in which Iran is seemingly backing all sides. And with General Petraeus calling for an indefinite pause in the drawdown of U.S. troops after July, President Bush's so-called "return on success" has apparently once again been postponed.
Here, then, are five questions for Petraeus and Crocker:
1. Did Iranian personnel play a role in the recent fighting in Basra? If so, on whose side(s)?
The Sunday Times this weekend wrote, "Iranian forces were involved in the recent battle for Basra, General David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, is expected to tell Congress this week." But in the three-way Shiite battle for Basra in which Iran was said to back all sides, the issue becomes which forces Tehran supported in the fighting.
No doubt, Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army militia has received logistical help from Iran. (Prime Minister Maliki's own Dawa Party also has direct ties to Tehran.) But the largest Shiite military-political force in Iraq, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and its associated Badr Brigades, is the biggest beneficiary of Iranian largesse:

Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations noted the ISCI "was essentially created by Iran, and its militia, the Badr Brigade, was trained and equipped by the Revolutionary Guards" - which the Bush administration calls a "terrorist" organization.
Journalist Gareth Porter added the Badr militia is the "most pro-Iranian political-military forces in Iraq." In fact, ISCI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim "met with [Iranian Revolutionary Guard] officers to be his guests in December 2006, apparently to discuss military assistance to the Badr Organization."

Nonetheless, SIIC's leader Abdul Azziz al-Hakim was warmly greeted by President Bush at the White House in December 2006. Just last month, Vice President Cheney visited Hakim at his Baghdad compound.
As Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) pointed out on March 30:

"The Iranians have close associations with all the Shia communities, not only with Sadr but also Hakim...The notion that this is a fight by American allies against Iranian-inspired elements is not accurate."

2. What is the status of Al Qaeda in Iraq? Is it on the brink of defeat? If so, is the primary rationale for a continued American presence evaporating?
Back in October, the Washington Post reported that the Pentagon believed it had dealt "devastating and perhaps irreversible blows to al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months."
As Karen de Young and Thomas Ricks (author of Fiasco, perhaps the defining military analysis of the invasion of Iraq) detailed, the drop-off in Al Qaeda attacks and the improving alliances with Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province were leading some American military leaders to advocate a "declaration of victory":

Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, head of the Joint Special Operations Command's operations in Iraq, is the chief promoter of a victory declaration and believes that AQI has been all but eliminated, the military intelligence official said. But Adm. William J. Fallon, the chief of U.S. Central Command, which oversees Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, is urging restraint, the official said. The military intelligence official, like others interviewed for this report, spoke on the condition of anonymity about Iraq assessments and strategy.
Senior U.S. commanders on the ground, including Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. forces in Iraq, have long complained that Central Command, along with the CIA, is too negative in its analyses. On this issue, however, Petraeus agrees with Fallon, the military intelligence official said.

Given that Al Qaeda in Iraq over the past two years has been responsible for only a small fraction of the attacks against U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians, is there not a Catch-22 for President Bush? That is, does the very dissipation of the Al Qaeda threat in Iraq remove his primary rationale for extending the American presence there?
As de Young and Ricks asked, does a declaration of the defeat of Al Qaeda "fuel criticism that the Iraq conflict has become a civil war in which U.S. combat forces should not be involved?"
3. Can the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" be trusted? Might they come to pose a threat to the Iraqi government in Baghdad?
There's little question that the creation of U.S. funded Sunni "Awakening Councils" have played a critical role in reducing violence against American troops and in beating back Al Qaeda in Iraq.
But there are increasing signs that the "Sons of Iraq," now numbering 90,000, may themselves become a source of instability. In November, Sami al Askari, a Shiite lawmaker who speaks to Prime Minister Maliki daily, worried, "When the U.S. leaves, what we'll have are two armies; one who's loyal to the government and one not loyal." In Diyala province, the Sons of Iraq recently split into two factions. And as the Washington Post reported on March 31, Col. Michael Fuller, chief of staff of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, "said he expects the Baghdad government to incorporate about 20 percent of them into the Iraqi security forces over time." In an April 4 in a piece titled "Iraq's Sunni Time Bomb," former First Calvary Division political advisor Matt Sherman wrote:

"Failure to find a new role for the Sons of Iraq, however, will result in the deterioration of government authority, an inability to draw down our own forces, and a return to militia rule for much of Iraq."

General Petraeus has said they will stay loyal to the American cause "as long as it is in their interests." Is there a still a convergence of interests? Or only as long the Sons of Iraq are paid by the American people?
4. Who is the enemy for the United States in Iraq? Do the United States and the Maliki government share common foes and common friends?
The fiasco in Basra again raises the question as to whether the United States and the Maliki government in Baghdad really share common objectives and common enemies. As I noted in November:

More and more, President Bush's strategy in Iraq resembles an M.C. Escher illustration. Like the hands drawing each other or the elegant depiction of stairways that cannot possibly meet, the military progress of the U.S. surge is producing an image of a future Iraq that, while glorious to behold, can never be built. The very American alliances with Sunni tribal leaders that are reducing sectarian violence and the threat from Al Qaeda also threaten to undermine the Shiite majority government in Baghdad. And the "enduring" U.S. presence announced by President Bush may serve only to protect the Maliki government from its domestic enemies, not its friend and American foe Iran. If anything, the surge may be making the prospect of Iraqi national reconciliation even more remote.

As American forces battle the Mahdi Army in the streets of Sadr City, analysts increasingly view the Maliki assault in Basra as an effort to crush the Sadrists in advance of October provincial elections in which his Dawa party and its ally the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council will lose seats. More importantly, the SIIC seeks to promote a nine-province Shiite regional government in the south, a move opposed by Sadr and his followers. Such a development would seem to run counter to stated American positions.
Meanwhile, as the fighting rages in Baghdad, Iraq faces an ominous deadline as Moqtada al Sadr responds to the Iraqi government demand to disarm the Mahdi Army or face a ban from political participation. Should Sadr choose to stand and fight, will the United States be at the forefront? Will the U.S. demand that other militias currently allied to Maliki, including Hakim's Badr Brigades and the Kurdish peshmerga, also disarm? Will the U.S. press the Maliki government to absorb the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" into the Iraqi security forces, as it has done with 10,000 of the Badr Brigades?
5. Are the Iraqis "Standing Up?"
President Bush has famously (or infamously) argued that "as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down." In the wake of Prime Minister Maliki's offensive against the Mahdi Army is Basra, are we any closer to that happening?
No doubt, that the Iraqi security forces were able to mount the operation at all represents some progress over its past cut and run performances. But the assault on Basra, launched without prior coordination with the United States quickly ground to a halt. News accounts report at least 1,000 Iraqi personnel abandoned their units, including two high ranking officers. Ultimately, U.S. forces and air strikes were needed to help secure Basra. In addition, the British, who had earlier rejected American requests for a surge back into Basra, played a much larger role in backing the Maliki forces than was initially reported. (In the wake of the fighting, the planned British pull-out from southern Iraq has been put on hold.) Worse still, the carnage in Basra was halted only after Iraqi lawmakers traveled to Iran, where a general of the Qods Force (labeled a terrorist organization by the United States) brokered a deal with the Sadrists.
Since September, President Bush replaced his "we're making progress" talking point with the mantra of "return on success." That is, as the situation improves on the ground in Iraq, more American troops will be coming home. But with General Petraeus' announcement that U.S. force levels will be indefinitely maintained at 140,000 troops following the last planned drawdowns in July, there is apparently no return on success. And negotiations for a new strategic framework agreement between the U.S. and Iraq may codify that open-ended commitment.
While President Bush declared two weeks ago that "normalcy is returning back to Iraq" (a point John McCain echoed Monday when he claimed Iraq was returning to "something approaching normal"), the grim reality in the ground still raises the questions. When can the American people expect to receive the return on success? When can U.S. troops stand down?